Functional Intimate Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift To Save the Roberts Framework by Roling, Joshua P.
ROLING IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2011 6:44:29 AM 
 
Notes 
FUNCTIONAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
ANALYSIS: A DOCTRINAL SHIFT TO SAVE 
THE ROBERTS FRAMEWORK 
JOSHUA P. ROLING† 
ABSTRACT 
  In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Supreme Court recognized 
intimate association as one of the two distinct senses of the freedom of 
association. In doing so, the Court identified two essential functions 
that justify constitutional protection for the relationships that provide 
them: intimate relationships cultivate and transmit shared ideals and 
beliefs, and they provide opportunities for emotional enrichment and 
self-identification by facilitating the creation of close bonds among 
members. Then, recognizing that familial relationships often 
exemplify these functions, the Court identified four aspects of family 
relationships that would help distinguish intimate from nonintimate 
associations: size, purpose, selectivity, and seclusion from others. 
Despite the secondary role of these aspects, subsequent decisions have 
focused solely on these four characteristics without even mentioning 
the justifications that originally supported constitutional protection. 
This factor-based analysis has resulted in unpredictable and 
inconsistent decisions that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the 
entire Roberts framework. Drawing from the original functional 
justifications, this Note argues that courts must abandon their sole 
reliance on the Roberts factors and instead adopt a functional 
analysis that properly appreciates the right’s underlying values and 
ensures that groups reflecting those values are consistently protected. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2004, a group of students at the College of Staten Island 
(CSI)1 applied to have the Chi Iota Colony of the Alpha Epsilon Pi 
Fraternity officially recognized by CSI.2 Because the fraternity 
allowed only male students to join, the college determined that it 
violated CSI’s antidiscrimination policy and withheld recognition.3 As 
a result, the fraternity could not use CSI’s facilities, calendars, and 
bulletin boards; receive funding from CSI; associate the college’s 
name with the group’s name; or distribute information on campus to 
recruit new members.4 The fraternity sued for a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy, 
alleging that CSI had violated its rights of intimate and expressive 
association.5 In Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City 
University of New York,6 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York concluded that “[u]nder the totality of 
circumstances, considering the Fraternity’s relatively small size, 
exclusivity in membership, and seclusion in activities central to the 
group’s purposes, [the] plaintiffs ha[d] shown ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ 
likelihood of success on the merits that the Fraternity qualifie[d] as an 
intimate association.”7 The court therefore granted the injunction.8 
After hearing the case on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that “[b]ased on its size, level of selectivity, purpose, and 
inclusion of non-members, the Fraternity lack[ed] the characteristics 
that typify groups with strong claims to intimate association.”9 Even 
though both courts considered the same factors in reaching their 
opposite conclusions, neither court explained why those factors were 
determinative or how they were relevant to analyzing the group’s 
level of intimacy. Nevertheless, as the courts struggled to define the 
 
 1. The College of Staten Island is a senior college within the City University of New York. 
Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 2. Id. at 380. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 381. 
 6. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 
374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 7. Id. at 387. 
 8. Id. at 397. 
 9. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 147 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
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attributes of a constitutionally protected intimate association, the Chi 
Iota Colony—having been denied access to the resources enjoyed by 
other student groups—disbanded while its case was before the 
Second Circuit.10 
More than fifty years before the Chi Iota Colony’s case reached 
the Second Circuit, Justice Goldberg opined that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes limits on a state’s ability to regulate truly 
private relationships. He explained, “[I]t is the constitutional right of 
every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his 
social intimates . . . . These and other rights pertaining to privacy and 
private association are themselves constitutionally protected 
liberties.”11 Twenty years after Justice Goldberg wrote these words, in 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,12 the Supreme Court recognized the right of 
intimate association as one of the “two distinct senses” of the 
freedom of association.13 The Roberts Court identified two functions 
that are characteristic of the kinds of intimate associations that are 
entitled to constitutional protection: First, these associations 
“cultivat[e] and transmit[] shared ideals and beliefs.” Second, they 
provide opportunities for emotional enrichment and self-
identification by facilitating the creation of close bonds.14 Because 
familial relationships exemplify these roles, the Court concluded that 
the distinguishing aspects of family relationships—their size, purpose, 
selectivity, and seclusion from others—would help identify similar 
groups that “are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an 
understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of 
personal liberty.”15 
Although these factors were intended to serve as proxies for the 
underlying values of intimate association, courts considering intimate 
association claims by nonfamily groups after Roberts—including the 
Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony—have increasingly analyzed a 
group’s intimacy solely based on some combination of the group’s 
 
 10. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 149, 191 (2010). 
 11. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 12. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 13. Id. at 617. The other half of the freedom of association—expressive association—is 
anchored in the First Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite its status as 
one part of the freedom of association, expressive association is largely beyond the scope of this 
Note because these two types of associative freedom are usually analyzed separately. 
 14. Id. at 618–19. 
 15. Id. at 620. 
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size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusion of nonmembers—the Roberts 
factors.16 Disconnected from the values that they were intended to 
help identify, these factors provide no basis for meaningful 
comparison. As a result, a group’s level of constitutional protection 
often depends on a court’s unpredictable and arbitrary analysis of the 
group’s objective characteristics in light of the court’s own conception 
of what constitutes intimacy.17 
Regardless of whether the fraternity in Chi Iota Colony was truly 
an intimate association entitled to constitutional protection,18 the 
factor-based analysis employed in these cases denies groups the 
ability to make a direct case for protection and creates uncertainty for 
similarly situated groups across the country. This Note argues that to 
develop a consistent and workable framework for intimate 
association analysis, courts should abandon their myopic reliance on 
the Roberts factors and adopt a functional analysis that determines a 
group’s intimacy based on whether the group performs the two 
functions that Roberts identified as defining intimate associations: 
(1) “cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs” and 
(2) facilitating the creation of close ties between members.19 
The functional analysis proposed by this Note differs from 
traditional responses to intimate association decisions. These 
responses typically fall into one of two categories: either they accept 
the factor-based analysis as a given and object to a court’s particular 
 
 16. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987) 
(“In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant 
constitutional protection, we consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether 
others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship.”); Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In determining the nature of a given 
relationship, relevant factors to consider include a group’s ‘size, purpose, policies, selectivity, 
congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent.’” (quoting 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620)); La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 
1494 (5th Cir. 1995) (“In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently private to 
warrant constitutional protection, as well as the scope of that protection, the Court has 
considered several factors, including: (1) the organization’s size; (2) its purposes; (3) the 
selectivity in choosing its members; (4) the congeniality among its members; (5) whether others 
are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship; and, (6) other characteristics that in a 
particular case may be pertinent.”). 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. Because both the district court and the court of appeals organized their analyses 
around the Roberts factors, the decisions provided little insight into the actual role that the 
group played in the life of its members and did very little to answer the key question of whether 
the group provided the benefits that should have entitled it to constitutional protection. 
 19. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19. 
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application of the factors,20 or they advocate an abandonment of the 
Roberts intimate and expressive association framework altogether in 
favor of a broader right of assembly.21 Taking a middle ground, this 
Note proposes that the Roberts framework can be salvaged, but only 
if courts shift their analysis of intimate association claims from one 
that is based on the formulaic application of the Roberts factors to 
one that requires a substantive consideration of the group’s functions. 
Parts I.A and I.B review the early foundations of the right of 
intimate association and its initial recognition in Roberts, noting both 
the functional and factor-based characteristics of intimate associations 
identified by the Supreme Court. Part I.C examines the entrenchment 
of factor-based analysis after Roberts as courts have applied the right 
of intimate association to nonfamily social groups. Part II 
demonstrates two inherent shortcomings of any approach that 
attempts to work within the current factor-based doctrine. First, Part 
II.A examines intimate association precedent to demonstrate the 
unpredictability and inconsistency that is inherent in each of the 
Roberts factors. Second, Part II.B illustrates the potential for a group 
to manipulate the Roberts factors to improve its level of constitutional 
protection without making any substantive changes to the role that 
the group plays in the lives of its members. Finally, Part III proposes 
a functional intimate association analysis that will overcome the 
problems posed by factor-based analysis and will protect groups that 
more closely reflect the values underlying the right of intimate 
association. 
I.  RECOGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
RIGHT OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 
A. Doctrinal Foundations of the Right of Intimate Association 
The freedom of association was first recognized by the Supreme 
Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.22 In Patterson, the 
NAACP challenged the constitutionality of an order by an Alabama 
 
 20. See, e.g., Clinton N. Daggan, Case Comment, Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi 
Fraternity v. City University of New York, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 627, 628 (2008/09) (“This 
case comment contends that the Second Circuit’s analysis was too stringent and is inconsistent 
with the United States Supreme Court’s and other federal circuit courts’ ‘spectrum’ analysis.”). 
 21. See Inazu, supra note 10, at 153–55 (proposing that the categories of intimate and 
expressive association should be eliminated and that courts should begin to apply the right of 
assembly as a means of strengthening group autonomy). 
 22. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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state court requiring it to disclose the names of its members.23 Finding 
that the order constituted an unconstitutional interference with the 
group’s associational rights,24 the Supreme Court held that the 
“freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces 
freedom of speech.”25 Because it relied on both the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of liberty and the First Amendment’s 
protection of free speech, however, the decision did not precisely 
define the constitutional source of the freedom of association.26 
In Griswold v. Connecticut,27 the Court established the 
foundation of the right of intimate association by identifying the right 
of privacy as falling within the “penumbras” formed by the various 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.28 In doing so, the Court 
extended the “zone of privacy” to include not only the privacy of 
membership lists that had allowed the NAACP’s members in 
Patterson to associate without interference, but also the privacy to 
enter into and maintain private personal relationships.29 The Griswold 
Court concluded by identifying the two ends of the spectrum of 
relationships that would qualify for protection—with marriage on one 
end and groups like the NAACP on the other.30 The Court held that 
marriage, unlike the association protected in Patterson, “is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
 
 23. Id. at 454. 
 24. Id. at 462–63. 
 25. Id. at 460 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
 26. See John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 
TENN. L. REV. 485, 517 (2010) (“It was clear that the Court had broken new constitutional 
ground in NAACP v. Alabama, but specifying exactly what had taken place proved elusive.”); 
id. at 558 (noting Justice Douglas’s preference for basing the right of association in the First 
Amendment—the “incorporation argument”—and Justice Brennan’s preference for basing the 
right in the Fourteenth Amendment—the “liberty argument”). 
 27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 28. Id. at 484. 
 29. See id. at 485–86 (noting that the right of privacy within marriage is protected by the 
right of association). 
 30. Id. at 483 (“In like context, we have protected forms of ‘association’ that are not 
political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the 
members.” (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1963))). This Note argues that, 
rather than simply staking out two types of protected associations, those similar to the NAACP 
and those related to marriage, the Court actually suggested a spectrum between the privacy 
necessary to protect expressive associations such as the NAACP and the privacy inherent in 
marital relationships. This spectrum includes a wide variety of associations, including fraternal 
relationships. 
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living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any 
involved in our prior decisions.”31 
Professor Kenneth Karst argues that Griswold and its progeny 
can all “be seen as variations on a single theme: the freedom of 
intimate association.”32 Karst defines an intimate association as “a 
close and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some 
significant way comparable to a marriage or family relationship.”33 In 
his view, these relationships are primarily distinguished by some 
mixture of “living in the same quarters, or sexual intimacy, or blood 
ties, or a formal relationship.”34 Explaining why such associations 
should be protected, Karst identifies four benefits provided by 
intimate associations: (1) “the opportunity to enjoy the society of” 
others,35 (2) the opportunity “to love and be loved” in committed 
relationships,36 (3) the emotional enrichment from “close and 
enduring association,”37 and (4) the formative effect that close 
relationships have on an individual’s self-identification.38 Although 
the Supreme Court did not cite Karst’s article when it recognized the 
right of intimate association in Roberts, many of Professor Karst’s 
values were reflected in the Court’s rationales for protecting intimate 
associations.39 
B. Supreme Court Recognition of Intimate Association Rights 
In Roberts, the Court separated the two recognized sources of 
constitutional support for the right of association—the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments—and concluded for the first time that the 
 
 31. Id. at 486. 
 32. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980). 
 33. Id. at 629. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 630–31. 
 36. Id. at 632–33. 
 37. Id. at 633–35. 
 38. Id. at 635–37. 
 39. For example, the Court explained the rationale for recognizing the right of intimate 
association by reasoning: “[T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the 
realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with 
others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards 
the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.” 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984); see also Inazu, supra note 10, at 165 & n.83 
(“Brennan’s Roberts opinion never cites Karst’s article, but the intellectual debt is apparent.”). 
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freedom of association encompasses two distinct rights.40 The first, 
intimate association—anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment—
protects the ability to “enter into and maintain certain intimate 
human relationships.”41 The second, expressive association—
anchored in the First Amendment—protects the “right to associate 
for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First 
Amendment.”42 
The right of intimate association, as envisioned by the Roberts 
Court, promotes individual liberty43 by protecting human 
relationships that facilitate cultural and personal development from 
undue interference by the state.44 To distinguish intimate from 
nonintimate associations, the Court in Roberts described both the 
functions and the characteristics of intimate associations.45 Despite the 
tendency of courts in later cases to focus on only a few of these 
characteristics,46 this Note argues that the controlling consideration 
should be whether the group performs the defining functions of 
intimate associations and, as a result, provides the benefits to its 
members that justify constitutional protection for those associations. 
1. Defining Functions of Intimate Associations.  Although it left 
the door open for other considerations, the Court specifically noted 
two characteristic functions of intimate associations: (1) “cultivating 
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs” and (2) providing the 
opportunity to experience the “emotional enrichment” that 
individuals gain from “close ties with others.”47 These functions 
provide the basis for the analysis proposed in Part III. 
The decisions cited by the Roberts Court in support of the first 
function demonstrate the importance of intimate associations, wholly 
apart from their potential expressive value, in limiting the state’s 
ability to define or control social and cultural norms through 
 
 40. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617 (“Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected 
‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 618. 
 43. See id. at 617–18 (“[C]hoices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human 
relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such 
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional 
scheme.”). 
 44. Id. at 617–19. 
 45. Id. at 618–20. 
 46. See infra Part I.C. 
 47. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19. 
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otherwise-legitimate actions. In this sense, intimate associations 
“foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and 
the power of the State.”48 The Court has, therefore, overruled state 
actions that prohibit marriage,49 preempt decisions about 
procreation,50 limit a family’s ability to cohabitate,51 interfere with 
parental control over the education of children,52 or significantly 
disrupt or threaten political organizations.53 These examples 
demonstrate the importance of an individual’s ability to develop, 
share, and act upon his beliefs in an attempt to preserve a unique, and 
even unpopular, way of life. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,54 the 
Court explained, “The freedom to associate applies to the beliefs we 
share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It tends to produce the 
diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic 
 
 48. Id. at 619. 
 49. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (“It is not surprising that the decision 
to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. . . . Surely, a decision to marry and raise the 
child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee’s right to 
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which 
the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.”). 
 50. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (“The present case, then, 
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives 
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a 
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.”). 
 51. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(“Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the 
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a 
household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of 
constitutional recognition.”). 
 52. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[A] State’s interest in universal 
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it 
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to 
the religious upbringing of their children . . . .”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”). 
 53. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“Of course, it is 
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, 
economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing 
the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”). 
 54. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). 
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government . . . .”55 Thus, the protection of a group’s ability to share 
its beliefs internally, regardless of any external message, benefits both 
its members and the nation as a whole. Accordingly, when analyzing 
an intimate association claim, a court should consider the potential 
for a group to cultivate and transmit shared ideals and beliefs. 
In contrast to the first function’s societal benefits, the second 
function—the facilitation of close relationships among members of 
the group—emphasizes the individual benefits of intimate 
associations. As the Roberts Court explained, “Protecting these 
relationships . . . safeguards the ability independently to define one’s 
identity.”56 Recognizing an additional benefit of close relationships, 
Professor Karst argues that “[f]or most of us, the chief value in 
intimate association is the opportunity” to “love and be loved” and to 
care and be cared for through committed relationships.57 Although 
family relationships may often provide opportunities for personal 
development, entitling family relationships to special recognition,58 
these opportunities are not restricted to the family alone.59 In fact, the 
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment allows individuals to 
satisfy their “intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [their] 
own home[s]” in a variety of ways.60 It is hard to imagine that private 
social groups might not also provide opportunities similarly worthy of 
constitutional protection. 
By recognizing the benefits of intimate associations rather than 
simply defining specific protected relationships, the Roberts Court 
laid the foundation for the decision in Board of Directors of Rotary 
 
 55. Id. at 575.  
 56. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). 
 57. Karst, supra note 32, at 632. 
 58. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have little doubt that the 
Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a 
natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of 
unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 
816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment))); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause . . . .”). 
 59. Nor are biological families always entitled to protection. See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 
255 (rejecting a biological father’s due process challenge to the adoption of his illegitimate child 
by another man because the biological father had never sought actual or legal custody of the 
child). 
 60. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a Georgia statute 
that prohibited the possession of obscene materials within the home). 
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International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.61 In that case, the Court held 
that although marriage, as “the foundation of the family and of 
society,”62 is a prototypical example of intimate association,63 the 
protection afforded by the right is not “restricted to relationships 
among family members.”64 Indeed, the Court had previously 
explained the wide variety of protected nonexpressive associations in 
Gilmore, holding: 
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, 
all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also 
permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. 
Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates 
must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.65 
2. External Characteristics of Intimate Associations.  After 
explaining the functions and benefits that underlie the protection of 
intimate associations, the Roberts Court went on to describe the 
characteristics of relationships that “are likely to reflect the 
considerations that have led to an understanding of freedom of 
association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.”66 This 
statement suggests that these characteristics were only intended to 
serve a secondary role, helping courts identify groups that are likely 
to produce the two benefits on which the Court based its decision in 
Roberts. 
Building on well-established precedent recognizing the 
importance of family relationships, the Roberts Court explained that 
intimate associations, like families, “involve deep attachments and 
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one 
shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and 
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”67 
 
 61. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 62. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 
211 (1888)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 63. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (“The personal affiliations that 
exemplify these considerations, and that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the 
relationships that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend 
the creation and sustenance of a family . . . .”). 
 64. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545. 
 65. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (quoting Moose Lodge No. 
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 66. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
 67. Id. at 619–20. 
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Recognizing the need for flexibility in identifying associations that 
deserve protection, the Court explained that a “broad range of 
human relationships . . . may make greater or lesser claims to 
constitutional protection.”68 The Court marked the ends of this 
spectrum by noting that family relationships exemplify intimate 
association and are entitled to the strongest constitutional protection, 
whereas “large business enterprise[s]” are “remote” from the 
underlying values of intimate association and are not entitled to 
protection.69 To further aid lower courts in the difficult task of 
assessing a relationship’s constitutional value,70 the Court identified 
five factors—the Roberts factors—that have become the framework 
for current intimate association analysis. These factors “include size, 
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics 
that in a particular case may be pertinent.”71 
The Roberts Court then applied these factors to determine 
whether the Jaycees, a nonprofit organization open only to young 
men, qualified as an intimate association. The Court began its analysis 
by noting that the local chapters at issue in the case had 400 and 430 
members respectively.72 In a discussion of the group’s purpose, the 
Court cited the Jaycees’ bylaws, finding that the Jaycees’ mission was 
to develop a “spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest,” to 
provide members with an opportunity for personal development, and 
to “develop true friendship and understanding among young men of 
all nations.”73 Then, analyzing the selectivity of the group, the Court 
found that the Jaycees were “basically unselective,” noting in 
particular that age and sex were the only criteria for membership and 
that new members were regularly “admitted with no inquiry into their 
backgrounds.”74 Finally, the Court found that the Jaycees did not 
maintain policies that excluded nonmembers from critical aspects of 
the relationship because nonmembers of both genders were regularly 
 
 68. Id. at 620. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. (“Determining the limits of state authority over an individual’s freedom to enter 
into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that 
relationship’s objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the 
most attenuated of personal attachments.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 621. 
 73. Id. at 612–13 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 2, Roberts 468 U.S. 609 (No. 83-724), 1984 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 237, at *5) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 74. Id. at 621. 
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invited to participate in a substantial portion of “activities central to 
the decision of many members to associate with one another.”75 Based 
on these considerations, the Court held that the Jaycees “lack[ed] the 
distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection 
to the decision of its members to exclude women.”76 
C. Entrenchment of Factor-Based Intimate Association Analysis 
Three years later, the Court considered whether California’s 
Unruh Civil Rights Act,77 which prohibits discrimination “in all 
business establishments,”78 violated the Rotary Club’s right of 
intimate association.79 In holding that the Rotary Club was not an 
intimate association, the Court relied exclusively on the factors it had 
identified in Roberts. Beginning with an analysis of the group’s size, 
the Court found that local chapters ranged from twenty to more than 
nine hundred members and that those members were instructed to 
keep a flow of new members coming in, both to enlarge membership 
and to make up for a turnover rate of about 10 percent each year.80 
Next, the Court noted that the purpose of the Rotary Club was to 
“produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership” that created a 
“cross section of the business and professional life of the 
community,”81 and that Rotary Clubs were encouraged to include all 
“qualified prospective members located within [their] territory,” 
avoiding “arbitrary limits” on membership.82 Finally, the Court found 
that “[m]any of the Rotary Clubs’ central activities [were] carried on 
in the presence of strangers,” and that Rotary Clubs “[sought] to keep 
their ‘windows and doors open to the whole world.’”83 
Although these early intimate association cases were consistent 
with each other and likely reached the same conclusions as would 
have resulted from functional analyses, they have nevertheless had a 
limiting effect on the development of the right of intimate association. 
The Court’s denial of constitutional protection to two nonfamily 
groups within three years of recognizing the right of intimate 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987). 
 80. Id. at 546. 
 81. Id. (quoting 1 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, FOCUS ON ROTARY 60–61 (1981)). 
 82. Id. at 547. 
 83. Id. (quoting 1 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY, supra note 81, at 60–61). 
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association likely signaled a stricter standard for intimate association 
claims than otherwise would have been required by the right’s 
underlying rationale. Roberts and Duartes also provided a framework 
for dismissing intimate association claims without a substantive 
investigation into the nature of the relationships at issue. In City of 
Dallas v. Stanglin,84 for example, the Supreme Court rejected the 
claim that a city ordinance establishing age and hour restrictions on 
“teenage” dance halls violated the patrons’ associational rights.85 
Dismissing the ordinance’s impact on intimate association in one 
sentence, the Court concluded, “It is clear beyond cavil that dance-
hall patrons, who may number 1,000 on any given night, are not 
engaged in the sort of ‘intimate human relationships’ referred to in 
Roberts.”86 
A reliance on an increasingly strict application of the factors 
alone can be seen in subsequent circuit court opinions concerning 
intimate association claims by social clubs. In Louisiana Debating & 
Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans,87 the Fifth Circuit considered 
whether the application of a city ordinance that prohibited 
discrimination in places of public accommodation violated the 
intimate or private associational rights of four exclusive clubs.88 
Applying the Roberts factors, the court found that the clubs, which 
had between 325 and 1000 members and lacked any affiliation with a 
national organization, were “[r]elatively small in size.”89 The purpose 
of the clubs was exclusively social, the court held, and all of the clubs 
had very restrictive admissions processes, including rigorous 
screening and votes by the general membership.90 The court also 
favorably noted that the clubs had policies that strictly excluded 
nonmembers from using club facilities.91 Based solely on these 
 
 84. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989). 
 85. Id. at 20–22. 
 86. Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984)). The case was 
ultimately decided under the rubric of expressive association, and only Justices Stevens and 
Blackmun would have considered the existence of a general right of “social association” under 
the Fourteenth rather than the First Amendment. Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 87. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483 (5th Cir. 1995).  
 88. See id. at 1493 n.15 (explaining that the Supreme Court uses the broad term “private 
association” to connote constitutional protections for organizations and relationships outside 
the family). 
 89. Id. at 1497. 
 90. Id. at 1496. 
 91. Id. 
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considerations, the court concluded that “the Clubs constitute 
organizations whose location on the spectrum of personal 
attachments places them near those that are ‘most intimate.’”92 They 
were, therefore, entitled to “the fullest protection of their right of 
private association.”93 
In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh,94 the 
Third Circuit denied a fraternity’s claim that its associational rights 
were violated when its university recognition was revoked because 
four members had been arrested during a drug raid at the fraternity’s 
house.95 In a brief application of the Roberts factors that considered 
only the fraternity’s size, selectivity, and level of seclusion, the court 
concluded that the fraternity was not entitled to constitutional 
protection as an intimate association.96 Interestingly, the court made 
no mention of the fraternity’s purpose, which had been one of the 
primary considerations in Duarte and which is the factor that is 
arguably the most relevant in determining the functions the group will 
provide. 
Most recently, in Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit rejected 
the Chi Iota Colony’s intimate association claim by relying entirely on 
the Roberts framework.97 The court began by considering the size of 
the fraternity. Despite finding that the fraternity had only nineteen 
members, the court focused on the fact that the fraternity hoped one 
day to have as many as fifty pledges each semester and had no upper 
limit on membership, and concluded that the group’s size was a 
“product of circumstances, not a desire to maintain intimacy.”98 Next, 
the court considered the fraternity’s purpose. The court characterized 
the purposes of the fraternity as “broad, public-minded goals that 
[did] not depend for their promotion on close-knit bonds,” such as 
encouraging participation in university and community activities, 
engaging in community service, and expressing Jewish culture.99 
 
 92. Id. at 1497 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)). 
 93. La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497–98. 
 94. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 95. Id. at 438–39. 
 96. Id. at 442 (“All of these elements—the Chapter’s size, lack of selectivity, and lack of 
seclusion in its activities—support our conclusion that the Chapter lacks the essential 
characteristics of constitutionally protected intimate association.”). 
 97. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 
145–48 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 98. Id. at 145. 
 99. Id. at 146. 
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Having determined that the fraternity’s goal was broad and public-
minded, the court declined to assign any significance to the 
fraternity’s stated goal “to foster personal, intimate relationships 
between its members” because that goal was similar to that held by 
“nearly any student group in which members become close friends.”100 
The court also considered the fraternity’s selectivity. Although 
the court found that the fraternity “employ[ed] some care in selecting 
recruits in order to ensure that all its members [were] compatible,” 
the court ultimately emphasized the fact that the fraternity 
aggressively recruited new members from the student body, both to 
replace members who had graduated and to enlarge membership.101 
Further, the court held that because “a relatively high percentage of 
Jewish men at CSI who express[ed] an interest in the Fraternity 
[were] invited to join,” the selectivity of the group “compare[d] 
unfavorably with that employed in creating the strongest of 
associational interests, as in the cases of marriage or adoption.”102 
Finally, the court considered whether the fraternity sufficiently 
excluded nonmembers from its activities. Rejecting the district court’s 
conclusion that members-only weekly business meetings and secret 
rituals were “central to the Fraternity’s purpose,”103 the court instead 
determined that public recruitment events and parties for 
nonmembers were the “crucial aspects of its existence.”104 Because 
these events were open to the public, the court concluded that the 
fraternity, like the Jaycees or the Rotary Club, was not sufficiently 
exclusive.105 Based on this analysis, the Second Circuit concluded that 
“the Fraternity lack[ed] the characteristics that typify groups with 
strong claims to intimate association.”106 
Despite its general acceptance in the courts, this reliance on the 
Roberts factors has not gone entirely unnoticed. Professor Kevin 
Worthen purports to propose a functionalist approach to intimate 
association claims that would protect inner-city public schools and 
 
 100. Id. This finding is particularly problematic given the fact that the primary aim of the 
fraternity was to “foster and promote brotherly love.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 145. 
 102. Id. at 145–46. 
 103. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 
374, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 104. Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 147. 
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Native American tribes.107 Arguing that such an approach should 
protect entities that provide either the societal benefit of transmitting 
ideals and beliefs or the individual benefit of emotional enrichment,108 
Professor Worthen concludes that public schools could satisfy the first 
prong and Native American tribes could satisfy the second.109 
Professor Worthen recognizes the importance of justifying the use of 
the Roberts factors by identifying how they are relevant to the group’s 
ability to serve the characteristic functions of intimate associations. 
Nevertheless, he declines to consider the potential for courts to 
entirely alter the group of factors that they would analyze—say, by 
ignoring irrelevant Roberts factors and considering other factors that 
might be useful in a particular case. This default consideration of only 
the Roberts factors suggests their continued pervasiveness even 
among critics of the factor-based analysis. 
II.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF A FACTOR-BASED INTIMATE 
ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS 
The applications of factor-based analysis described in the 
previous Part reveal two inherent shortcomings. First, for a group 
seeking protection, the courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable analysis 
creates uncertainty about the strength and likely success of an 
intimate association claim. Second, factor-based analysis is a poor 
proxy for intimacy and is likely to be both underinclusive and 
overinclusive. Thus, in addition to denying protection to groups that 
may otherwise be considered intimate, factor-based analysis is 
susceptible to manipulation by groups that are able to adjust their 
physical attributes without any real increase in intimacy. 
A. Unpredictable and Inconsistent Analysis of the Roberts Factors 
1. Size.  Despite size’s being the first factor in the traditional 
Roberts analysis, courts have not identified a bright-line rule for the 
 
 107. Kevin J Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant Leap for Group Rights: 
Accommodating the Associational Role of “Intimate” Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REV. 595, 
598–99 (1993). 
 108. Id. at 605. 
 109. Id. at 609. By contrast, under the functional analysis proposed by this Note, both 
prongs of the functional analysis would have to be met. Thus, neither of Professor Worthen’s 
favored associations would likely qualify for protection. 
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size of an intimate association.110 On the one hand, the Supreme Court 
has found that local Rotary Clubs, ranging from fewer than twenty to 
more than nine hundred members, were not intimate.111 On the other 
hand, the Fifth Circuit has accepted the intimate association claims of 
several New Orleans clubs with between six hundred and one 
thousand members.112 And in her concurrence in New York State Club 
Ass’n v. City of New York,113 Justice O’Connor suggested that in a city 
as large as New York, a club with more than four hundred members 
could be intimate.114 These seemingly inconsistent holdings suggest at 
least two ways to analyze the size of a group seeking protection: by 
comparing the group’s size to that of the community in which it is 
located115 or by simply considering the absolute number of members 
without comparison to the surrounding community. 
With respect to a relative-size analysis, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in New York State Club Ass’n and the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Louisiana Debating provide indications of the relative 
sizes that might be acceptable. First, if the population of New York 
City is estimated to be approximately seven million,116 a four-
hundred-member group would represent 0.006 percent of the total 
population. At the other end of the range, taking the population of 
New Orleans to be approximately five hundred thousand,117 a group 
 
 110. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. 
Supp. 2d 374, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s [Pi Lambda Phi] decision does not 
give the court clear direction, particularly since the Supreme Court has not established a bright 
line test when considering a group’s size.”), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 111. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1987). 
 112. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 113. N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
 114. Id. at 19 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 115. See Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (“In determining whether a group is 
intimate, the court should look at how small it is numerically in comparison to the potential pool 
of applicants.”). 
 116. Population Finder: New York City, New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.
census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo_id=16000US3651000&_
geoContext=01000US&_street=&_county=New+York&_cityTown=New+York&_state=04000
US36&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010
&_submenuId=population_0&ds_name=null&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull
&_keyword=&_industry= (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the population of New York 
City in the 1990 census). 
 117. Population Finder: New Orleans City, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=Search&geo_id=16000US3651000&_geo
Context=01000US%7C04000US36%7C16000US3651000&_street=&_county=new+orleans&_
cityTown=new+orleans&_state=04000US22&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoS
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with one thousand members would represent 0.2 percent of the 
population. Even if this analysis could provide a more consistent way 
to analyze a group’s size, it would still raise the question of whether 
one of two identical groups should be denied protection simply 
because it is located in a smaller community. 
Additionally, relative-size analysis does not make the factor-
based analysis any more predictable because it has not been 
uniformly accepted. In fact, in its first application of the Roberts 
framework, the Supreme Court in Duarte based its size analysis on 
the fact that local Rotary Clubs ranged from fewer than twenty to 
more than nine hundred members118 without considering the size of 
the cities in which the clubs were located. Similarly, the Second 
Circuit in Chi Iota Colony rejected the district court’s relative-size 
analysis119 and decided that the size of the group taken alone was the 
relevant factor.120 
If, however, the relevant consideration is the absolute size of the 
group, the analysis remains subject to uncertainty because there is no 
clear determination of what size constitutes intimacy. This uncertainty 
largely stems from the Duarte Court’s determination that Rotary 
Clubs were not intimate because they ranged in size from fewer than 
twenty to more than nine hundred members and from the fact that 
the Court failed to clarify which number in that range was too large. 
In Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit rejected the size of the 
hypothetical four-hundred-member intimate group suggested by 
Justice O’Connor and the nine-hundred-member upper range of the 
Rotary Club, concluding instead that because some of the local 
Rotary Clubs had had fewer than twenty members, the fraternity was 
similar in size to other unprotected groups.121 
Finally, in addition to lacking clear standards, both forms of 
analysis suffer from uncertainty as to how to measure the size of the 
 
elect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=160&_submenuId=population_0&ds_name=null&_ci_nbr=
null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry= (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) 
(providing the population of New Orleans in the 1990 census). 
 118. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987). 
 119. Chi Iota Colony, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 385. 
 120. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 145 
(2d Cir. 2007) (“The Fraternity currently has nineteen members, eighteen of whom are CSI 
students and one of whom is not. It aspires to one day have about fifty pledges per semester. 
But the Fraternity places no limit on membership size.”). 
 121. Id. (“These characteristics render the Fraternity similar to other groups whose 
intimate-association interests were held to be weak.” (citing Duarte, 481 U.S. at 546)). 
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group. First, although scholars have generally concluded that the size 
of local chapters, rather than the size of the national organization, is 
the relevant consideration,122 courts nevertheless have considered 
affiliation with a national organization as a factor that weighs against 
an intimacy claim.123 Second, and perhaps most surprisingly, the 
Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony determined that the relevant size 
was not the nineteen members the fraternity had at the time of the 
litigation but the fifty members it hoped to have one day.124 
2. Purpose.  The purpose of a group is arguably the factor that is 
most closely related to the underlying values of intimate association. 
For that reason, a group that explicitly seeks both to cultivate shared 
ideals and beliefs and to facilitate the creation of close bonds among 
its members should have a strong argument under both factor-based 
and functional analyses.125 Additionally, under the intimate 
association precedent summarized in the previous Part, to 
differentiate themselves from nonintimate groups such as the Jaycees 
and Rotary Clubs, groups seeking constitutional protection should 
neither encourage civic involvement or community service nor aim to 
provide business connections or networking benefits to their 
members. 
 
 122. See Gregory F. Hauser, Intimate Associations Under the Law: The Rights of Social 
Fraternities To Exist and To Be Free from Undue Interference by Host Institutions, 24 J.C. & U.L. 
59, 77 (1997) (“Thus, the clear weight of the case law indicates that it is an individual chapter’s 
size that must be assessed and that college social fraternity chapters are well within the 
‘relatively small’ requirement.” (quoting La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 
42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir. 1995)); Nancy S. Horton, Traditional Single-Sex Fraternities on 
College Campuses: Will They Survive in the 1990s?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 419, 436 (1992) (“Courts may 
reach an opposite conclusion, however, when the scope of the analysis is limited to the specific 
local chapter at the particular collegiate campus and undergraduate chapters are distinguished 
from alumni chapters.”); Scott Patrick McBride, Comment, Freedom of Association in the 
Public University Setting: How Broad Is the Right To Freely Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 133, 149 (1997) (“The Supreme Court recognizes that it is the size of the local 
chapter, not the entire national organization that weighs into the determination of intimacy.” 
(citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984))). 
 123. See, e.g., La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497 (“The Clubs are managed and controlled locally 
by their members; either directly, by an elected Board of Governors, or by both; none of the 
Clubs is associated with or controlled by a national organization.”). 
 124. See supra note 120. 
 125. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Debating concluded that the clubs at issue 
were sufficiently private to warrant constitutional protection based on the fact that the clubs 
sought “to maintain an atmosphere in which their members [could] enjoy the comradery and 
congeniality of one another.” La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1497. 
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Although these limitations are logical outgrowths of the privacy-
based foundations of the right, it is important to ask, as a normative 
matter, whether it makes sense to require groups to refrain from 
public participation to be constitutionally protected.126 This restriction 
is particularly troublesome given the fact that the quintessential 
intimate association—the family—is often the first setting in which 
children learn the importance of social responsibility and civic 
participation. As Part III explains, functional intimate association 
analysis removes this strange disincentive to perform public service 
by allowing groups to participate in public activities as long as those 
activities do not negatively affect their abilities to perform the two 
required functions of intimate association. 
Setting aside this policy objection, the very requirement that a 
court determine the purpose of a group introduces further 
uncertainty into the factor-based analysis. Just as an expressive 
group’s message is often subject to multiple interpretations,127 a 
purportedly intimate group may have more than one purpose. For 
this reason, the Court’s expressive association analysis in Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale128 is instructive. In that case, to determine whether 
the acceptance of a homosexual scoutmaster would impermissibly 
conflict with the Boy Scouts’ message on homosexuality, the Court 
deferred to the Boy Scouts’ assertion that homosexual conduct was 
inconsistent with the values they sought to instill in their members.129 
Despite the Supreme Court’s deference to an expressive group’s 
characterization of its message, courts considering the purpose of 
potential intimate associations often consider only their own 
characterizations of the groups’ respective purposes. For example, in 
Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit dismissed the fraternity’s 
assertion that group members shared “a community of thoughts, 
experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their lives” as 
being too similar to the associations that could be advanced by any 
 
 126. Cf. Daggan, supra note 20, at 635–36 (“The sad irony is that the repercussions of this 
decision will likely encourage even more discrimination by groups seeking to exercise intimate 
association rights. . . . As a result of the Second Circuit’s ruling, in order for a group to be 
accorded intimate association rights, it must be as discriminatory and secluded as possible.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Inazu, supra note 10, at 179–80 (listing three different characterizations of the 
Boy Scouts’ purpose articulated by various members, ranging from camping to providing single-
sex activities to creating opportunities for personal development). 
 128. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 129. Id. at 650 (“We accept the Boy Scouts’ assertion. We need not inquire further to 
determine the nature of the Boy Scouts’ expression with respect to homosexuality.”). 
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group in which members become friends.130 The court determined 
instead that the group’s primary purpose was the promotion of 
traditional fraternity values, community service, and the expression of 
Jewish culture.131 In addition to conflicting with the group’s own 
characterization of its purpose, this conclusion flew in the face of the 
majority of intimate association scholarship, which, prior to Chi Iota 
Colony, had generally concluded that fraternities had intimate 
purposes.132 
Finally, even if a court defers to a group’s characterization of its 
purpose, the analysis lacks a definite standard for determining which 
purposes are intimate. For example, in rejecting the fraternity’s 
statement that group members shared “a community of thoughts, 
experiences, beliefs, and distinctly personal aspects of their lives,”133 
the Second Circuit in Chi Iota Colony flatly contradicted the Supreme 
Court’s Roberts opinion, which had used that phrase to describe the 
defining purpose of intimate relationships.134 Although simply 
invoking the Roberts Court’s description of a family relationship is 
not sufficient to earn constitutional protection, the Second Circuit’s 
suggestion that such a description is meaningless indicates the wide 
discretion that courts have in defining a group’s purpose. 
 
 130. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 146 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Hauser, supra note 122, at 77–78 (noting that the primary purpose of fraternities is 
“to promote and encourage an interpersonal relationship and a life-long personal bond,” that 
“[s]econdary purposes include personal social and emotional development and, like Boy Sco[u]t 
troops, the instillation of values,” and that community-service participation is only a peripheral 
purpose (footnote omitted) (quoting Timothy A. Fischer, Single Sex Status Protected, 
FRATERNAL L. (Manley, Burke, Fischer & Lipton, Cincinnati, Ohio), Mar. 1994, at 3, 3)); 
Horton, supra note 122, at 439 (“The primary difference [between fraternities and service 
organizations] is the fraternities’ emphasis on brother/sister-hood. Greek organizations exist 
because students desire to seek friendships and form groups with others mirroring their values. 
Unlike the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs, fraternities focus on the individual and how that person 
can become a better individual in society.”). 
 133. Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“According to its president, Fraternity brothers form 
‘deep attachments and commitments’ and share ‘a community of thoughts, experiences, beliefs 
and distinctly personal aspects of their lives.’ But the same can be said of nearly any student 
group in which members become close friends.”). 
 134. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (“Family relationships, by their 
nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”).  
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3. Selectivity.  The extension of the right of intimate association 
to social groups, what the Fifth Circuit has referred to as “private 
association,” logically entails some requirement that membership not 
be completely open to the general public.135 Because few decisions 
have turned solely on a group’s selectivity, little guidance exists for a 
group attempting ex ante to determine its level of intimacy. Thus, to 
distinguish themselves from the Jaycees, who selected members based 
solely on age and gender without any background inquiry,136 or the 
Rotary Clubs, which were instructed to include all qualified 
prospective members in their territories,137 groups seeking protection 
must at a minimum carefully screen potential new members and 
develop specific membership requirements. Careful screening might 
be demonstrated by requiring all active members to vote on decisions 
about whether to admit new members and by giving a limited number 
of members the power to reject potential new members.138 In addition, 
some courts have considered the extent to which a group recruits 
aggressively from the general population.139 
In Chi Iota Colony, the Second Circuit based its decision largely 
on two factors: the fraternity’s relatively high turnover rate and the 
fact that the fraternity invited a large percentage of the Jewish men 
who had expressed interest to join.140 This analysis demonstrates two 
potential problems. First, although high turnover rates may indicate a 
lack of intimate relationships, taken alone, they are not conclusive. 
For example, whereas high turnover rates among new members might 
indicate that their lengths of membership were short and that they 
were therefore unlikely to have had time to develop close personal 
bonds, departing members might be those who had been in the group 
 
 135. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 n.15 (5th Cir. 
1995). In Louisiana Debating, the court used the term “private association” to refer to the 
constitutional protections of private clubs, noting that the Supreme Court did not limit the right 
of intimate association to familial situations. Id. 
 136. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621. 
 137. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987). 
 138. See, e.g., La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1496 (“Finally, whether to admit the prospective 
member is voted on by the general membership. A very limited number of objections deny 
membership . . . .”). 
 139. See, e.g., Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Chapter actively recruits new members from the University population at 
large and it is not particularly selective in whom it admits. The international organization of Pi 
Lambda Phi strongly encourages its chapters to recruit new members aggressively so as to 
continue the growth of the organization.”). 
 140. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 
145–46 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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the longest, increasing the probability that they had had ample time 
to create close relationships. Thus, courts that replace selectivity in 
the traditional sense—“the quality of carefully choosing 
someone . . . as the best or most suitable”141—with selectivity based on 
turnover rates essentially consider an entirely different factor from 
the one identified in Roberts, making it hard for groups seeking 
protection to predict how they will be judged. The second problem 
with the Second Circuit’s selectivity analysis is that the courts had 
wide leeway in framing this analysis. The Second Circuit’s 
consideration of the percentage of Jewish men expressing interest 
who were invited to join rather than the percentage of the entire 
student body or even the city of New York illustrates how even a 
relatively small group might nevertheless be considered unselective. 
4. Exclusion of Nonmembers.  In addition to placing limits on 
who can be a member, a private or intimate group must also make 
sure that only members participate in the group’s central activities.142 
Exclusivity seems to be a logical companion toand extension 
ofselectivity, but the determination of which events are central to a 
group is inherently ambiguous. This problem is compounded by the 
fact that courts, not members, make the final decision about which 
activities are central to the members’ decisions to associate with one 
another.143 
Most of the activities undertaken by typical groups can be 
classified as one of four general types of activities144: initiations or 
rituals, regular business meetings, recruitment events, and general 
public activities, such as community-service or social events. Of these, 
initiation ceremonies and other rituals are often the group’s most 
exclusive activities.145 Regular meetings are likely to be the next most 
 
 141. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 1613 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
 142. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (“Moreover, much of the activity 
central to the formation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of 
strangers to that relationship.”). 
 143. See id. (“Indeed, numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly participate in a 
substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one 
another, including many of the organization’s various community programs, awards ceremonies, 
and recruitment meetings.”). 
 144. Because no group is likely to be typical, these categories are intended only to be 
illustrative and not comprehensive. 
 145. See Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Decisions about whether to offer or revoke 
membership occur in private, as do the ceremonies in which prospective members become 
pledges and pledges become full members.”); Horton, supra note 122, at 438 (“Only initiated 
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exclusive,146 although groups vary widely on the extent to which 
nonmembers are allowed to attend meetings.147 Recruitment events, 
by necessity, involve nonmembers. Thus, to distinguish among groups 
based on this category of activity, courts have considered factors such 
as whether nonmembers must be invited to these events148 and 
whether the events take place in public locations.149 Finally, public 
activities, such as community-service events and parties, are intended 
to include, and are often for the benefit of, nonmembers.150 
Because many groups participate in all four categories of 
activities, a court’s decision regarding where to draw the line for 
defining central activities is crucial. Although this determination will 
 
fraternity members may attend meetings and other ritual ceremonies; nonmembers, outsiders, 
and even pledges of the fraternity may not participate in or even observe fraternity ritual 
ceremonies.”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“In addition, rituals are a critical aspect of 
Greek organizations’ relations. Most fraternities and sororities require that their rituals be kept 
secret, and require their members to swear under oath to keep them secret.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Weekly business meetings and frequent 
informal gatherings also take place only in the presence of members.”); Horton, supra note 122, 
at 438 (“Fraternities conduct all their meetings in an atmosphere of privacy, secrecy, and 
confidentiality . . . .”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“Most fraternities and sororities have 
meetings open to members only. Not only are the general public and guests prevented from 
joining in the meetings, but pledges are precluded from entering the meeting as well.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 147. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987) 
(“Members are encouraged to invite business associates and competitors to meetings. At some 
Rotary Clubs, the visitors number in the tens and twenties each week. . . . The clubs are 
encouraged to seek coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.” (quoting 
Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at G-24, Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (No. 86-421)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (“[D]espite their inability to vote, hold 
office, or receive certain awards, women affiliated with the Jaycees attend various 
meetings . . . .”). 
 148. See, e.g., La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1493 n.15 
(5th Cir. 1995) (“Only existing members may propose a new member.”).  
 149. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“Many rush events are held in public places 
such as local cafés or pool halls. During its February 2003 rush, the Fraternity planned several 
events requiring the interaction of current and prospective members with non-members—a 
party, as well as outings to a strip club, a karaoke bar, and a laser tag establishment.”). 
 150. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621 (“[N]umerous nonmembers of both genders regularly 
participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to 
associate with one another, including many of the organization’s various community 
programs . . . .”); Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 146 (“The Fraternity gives parties, sometimes at a 
profit, at which non-members—including women—are encouraged to attend.”); Pi Lambda Phi 
Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The Chapter also 
invites members of the public into its house for social activities and participates in many public 
University events.”); McBride, supra note 122, at 148 (“Not all aspects of Greek life are limited 
only to members, however. Fraternities and sororities hold formal and semi-formal dances and 
social parties to which members are permitted to bring a non-member guest.”). 
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necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis, this Note proposes that 
courts should consider the relative weight that members give each 
type of activity rather than substituting their own perceptions of 
which activities may be important to members. Moreover, as with 
purpose analysis, courts should be careful not to ignore the fact that 
even families, the quintessential intimate associations, often interact 
with the public without compromising their intimate status. 
5. Judicial Resort to Other Considerations.  Notwithstanding its 
general reliance on factor-based analysis in the context of clubs and 
social groups, the Supreme Court has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been 
willing to depart from the Roberts factors to deny intimate association 
protection to less sympathetic plaintiffs in other contexts. In FW/PBS, 
Inc. v. City of Dallas,151 the Court rejected the claim that patrons’ 
intimate association rights were violated by an ordinance classifying 
hotels that rented rooms for fewer than ten hours as sexually oriented 
businesses.152 Rather than applying the traditional Roberts factors, the 
Court considered directly whether the patrons’ associations were of 
the type that the right of intimate association was intended to 
protect.153 The Court ruled that “[a]ny ‘personal bonds’ that are 
formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten hours are not 
those that have ‘played a critical role in the culture and traditions of 
the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and 
beliefs.’”154 
This departure from the Roberts factors has two implications for 
this Note. First, by suggesting that the Roberts factors can be ignored 
when considering intimate association claims, the Court created even 
greater uncertainty about how any given claim will be analyzed. 
Second, by explicitly considering what this Note refers to as the first 
function of intimate association, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
FW/PBS demonstrated the potential for courts to apply the functional 
analysis proposed in Part III. 
B. Failure To Accurately Identify Intimate Groups 
In addition to the problems of inconsistency and unpredictability 
described in the previous Section, factor-based analysis is simply a 
 
 151. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). 
 152. Id. at 237. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19). 
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poor proxy for determining which groups actually promote the values 
that form the basis of the right of intimate association. Because courts 
traditionally consider only the Roberts factors—size, purpose, 
selectivity, exclusion of nonmembers, and other factors—in 
determining a group’s level of intimacy,155 a group may be able to 
manipulate its constitutional status by altering those specific 
attributes without altering the role it plays in the life of its members. 
Imagine, for example, a social club with fifty members. The club 
charges members a yearly fee for the use of its facilities. It has no 
limit on size, solicits new members from the general public, and 
imposes no requirements for membership other than that all 
members must be male. Male guests are allowed under very limited 
circumstances, and no female guests are ever admitted. Members do 
not generally know one another and share only casual interactions 
when they happen to be at the club at the same time. There are no 
weekly meetings. Finally, assume that the state in which the club is 
located has passed a law, similar to the Minnesota Human Rights Act 
at issue in Roberts, that prohibits gender discrimination in places of 
public accommodation.156 In response to a suit challenging its 
discriminatory membership policy, the club claims that it is an 
intimate association. Even under a generous application of the factor-
based analysis, this group is unlikely to qualify for protection. Its size, 
lack of selectivity, and general commercial purpose are almost certain 
to outweigh its credible argument about exclusivity. 
Now, assume that prior to the challenge, the group attempts to 
strengthen its intimacy claim by altering its relevant attributes to 
comply with intimate association precedent. It begins by officially 
limiting its size to fifty members. The club also requires that new 
members be invited by current members and earn the votes of 75 
percent of the current members. Information about the interests and 
backgrounds of potential new members is distributed to inform the 
 
 155. See supra Part I.C. 
 156. The pertinent part of the Act in Roberts provided: “It is an unfair discriminatory 
practice . . . [t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of 
race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex.” MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982); 
see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615 (examining claims under the Act). The Act defined “[p]lace of 
public accommodation” as a “business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, 
or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made 
available to the public.” MINN. STAT. § 363.01(18) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615 (examining the Act’s definition). 
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current members before they vote on new members. Finally, the 
group specifies that its purpose is to maintain an atmosphere in which 
its members can enjoy the camaraderie and congeniality of one 
another. 
Is the club more intimate under this second scenario than it was 
under the first? Although this question cannot be answered with legal 
certainty until after litigation,157 these changes bring the group closer 
to, if not within, the zone of constitutional protection created by 
intimate association precedent. The fifty-member limit, for example, 
is at least on the low end of the Duarte spectrum from twenty to nine 
hundred, and it is far smaller than the memberships of the clubs 
protected in Louisiana Debating. Additionally, the new membership 
requirements improve the group’s selectivity, making it more similar 
to the clubs protected in Louisiana Debating than the Jaycees or the 
Rotary Club. The new purposetaken directly from Louisiana 
Debating158will also likely strengthen the group’s purpose argument. 
Even with these changes, however, it is worthwhile to consider 
whether the group is any more like a family than the fraternity in Chi 
Iota Colony—or even than the Rotary Club—and whether it is any 
more deserving of constitutional protection. This central question is 
lost through an overreliance on factor-based analysis. 
*          *          * 
These illustrations highlight a central and inevitable problem in 
applying the Roberts factors without considering the underlying 
values of intimate association. Because the Roberts factors are merely 
tools to help identify the kinds of relationships deserving of 
constitutional protection, they are meaningless when disconnected 
from those underlying values. As a result, courts have almost 
unlimited discretion not only in framing each of the factors but also in 
determining how those factors will be compared with the 
characteristics of other protected or unprotected groups. Responding 
to this unpredictable and inconsistent application of traditional 
factor-based analysis, Part III argues that courts should abandon their 
sole reliance on the Roberts factors and adopt a functional intimate 
 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1497 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“[T]hey seek to maintain an atmosphere in which their members can enjoy the 
comradery and congeniality of one another.”). 
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association analysis under which a group’s intimacy is determined by 
its role in the life of its members. 
III.  FUNCTIONAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS 
A. Doctrinal Foundations and Benefits of Functional Analysis 
Rather than giving conclusive weight to a group’s physical 
characteristics, courts applying functional analysis should consider 
explicitly whether a group is likely to provide the benefitsboth to its 
members and to society as a wholethat justify the constitutional 
right of intimate association. In Roberts, the Court provided a 
framework for identifying groups that deserve protection by 
associating the central benefits of intimate associations with the 
specific functions that make them possible.159 According to the 
Roberts Court, a group that cultivates and transmits shared ideals and 
beliefs—the first characteristic function of intimate associations—
provides the societal benefits of increased diversity and separation 
between the individual and the power of the state.160 Similarly, a 
group that facilitates the creation of close ties with others—the 
second characteristic function of intimate associations—provides an 
opportunity for emotional enrichment that allows the group’s 
members to define their own identities.161 
Building on these two considerations, this Note argues that a 
court seeking to make the difficult and somewhat nebulous 
determination of whether a group “reflect[s] the considerations that 
have led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic 
element of personal liberty”162 should consider whether the group 
 
 159. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19 (“Without precisely identifying every consideration 
that may underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of 
personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as 
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State. Moreover, the constitutional 
shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from 
unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s 
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.” (citations omitted)); Worthen, supra note 107, 
at 605–06 (noting that the Roberts Court “identified two distinct constitutionally protected roles 
for intimate associations,” one that focuses on benefits to society and one that focuses on 
individual liberty). 
 160. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 620. 
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actually serves the functions identified rather than simply examining 
the group’s measurable characteristics. Under functional analysis in 
its simplest form, a group that sufficiently (1) cultivates and transmits 
shared ideals and beliefs and (2) facilitates the creation of close 
relationships among members would be entitled to constitutional 
protection. 
Although a wide range of relationships might serve these 
functions in some way, the Court’s recognition of familial 
relationships as the exemplary intimate associations heightens the 
standard for considering these functions and provides a necessary 
limitation on the groups that are entitled to protection.163 Only groups 
that serve these characteristic functions in a way that is similar to a 
family relationship deserve protection as intimate associations. 
Functional analysis, therefore, provides a more relevant and more 
accurate way to achieve the ultimate goal of traditional factor-based 
analysis: a meaningful comparison between the group seeking 
protection and a family relationship. 
Functional analysis also improves upon factor-based analysis by 
removing a level of abstraction from a court’s decision. In other 
words, the Court did not recognize the right of intimate association so 
that small, selective, and exclusive groups could exist. Instead, these 
factors serve as proxies for the likelihood that a group provides the 
benefits typically associated with intimate associations. Without 
making the connection between the factors and the defining 
characteristics of intimate associations explicit, however, courts can 
too easily lose sight of the real considerations that underlie 
constitutional protection and can confuse the factors with the 
rationale itself. Because the functions are directly responsible for the 
underlying benefits, a group’s intimacy can be properly determined 
based on whether the group cultivates and transmits shared beliefs 
and facilitates the creation of close bonds among members. Thus, 
functional analysis removes the danger of ignoring the underlying 
values of intimate association and clearly identifies the strong 
interests at stake when a group seeks protection from state 
interference. 
 
 163. See id. (“The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that 
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be entitled to this 
sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the creation of sustenance of a 
family . . . .”). 
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As Part III.B illustrates, it is in supporting functional analysis 
that the Roberts factors regain their meaning. Functional analysis 
therefore serves as a framework that allows courts to consider the 
traditional Roberts factors along with any other factors that are 
relevant to the group’s ability to serve the characteristic functions. 
Thus, although the size or selectivity of a group alone would not 
justify constitutional protection, both of those factors may be relevant 
in determining whether the group facilitates the creation of close 
relationships. In this way, functional analysis salvages the Roberts 
framework while ensuring that truly intimate groups receive 
constitutional protection. 
B. Application of Functional Intimate Association Analysis 
Because the Supreme Court has identified two characteristic 
functions of intimate associations, functional analysis ultimately 
breaks down into two distinct questions: (1) Does the group cultivate 
and transmit shared ideals and beliefs, and (2) does the group 
facilitate the creation of close bonds between members? For each of 
these questions, a court must determine first whether the group 
serves the requisite function and second how closely the group 
resembles a family relationship. Only a group whose functions are 
significantly similar to a family relationship’s functions will qualify for 
constitutional protection. This Section identifies some of the 
considerations that might be relevant in analyzing the two functions 
of intimate associations. 
A number of considerations might be relevant to a court’s 
determination that a group cultivates and transmits shared ideals and 
beliefs. Of the traditional Roberts factors, the purpose of the group, as 
stated in its governing documents or as viewed by its members, would 
serve as a useful starting point. A group whose primary purpose is to 
host social events or to participate in community service is unlikely to 
serve this first function, whereas a group whose stated purpose is to 
assist and direct its members’ personal development is more likely to 
transmit certain beliefs. Outside of the traditional Roberts factors, 
additional considerations may include whether the group has a clearly 
established moral code or code of conduct and whether the group 
conducts rituals and ceremonies for members. A group that espouses 
a moral code is more likely to transmit its beliefs to members in a 
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significant way.164 In the same fashion, a group that uses initiation 
rituals and other ceremonies will often have an opportunity to present 
its ideals and beliefs clearly and directly to its members. At the same 
time, groups with temporary or sporadic membership will often lack 
this opportunity. Thus, insofar as an established and consistent 
membership would better allow the group to transmit its beliefs, the 
traditional factors of selectivity and exclusion of nonmembers may be 
relevant. 
After determining that a group cultivates and transmits shared 
ideals and beliefs, the court must decide whether it does so in a way 
that is sufficiently similar to a family relationship. Because families 
are often the primary source of many personal ideals and beliefs, 
groups seeking protection face a relatively high standard. In FW/PBS, 
the Court specifically considered the extent to which a relationship 
cultivated and transmitted shared ideals and beliefs, finding that the 
patrons of a hotel room rented for fewer than ten hours would not 
form the types of relationships that are entitled to constitutional 
protection as a result of the critical role those relationships have 
played “in the culture and traditions of the Nation.”165 This ruling 
suggests that the duration of the relationship could be considered as 
one indication of the strength of the associational interests. 
Additionally, in a case involving a student group like the 
fraternity in Chi Iota Colony, a court may consider the extent to 
which the group serves as a surrogate family for its members. Under 
this analysis, student groups will often serve the function of 
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs to a greater 
extent than groups that are composed mostly of older adults. Based 
on this consideration, many college Greek-letter organizations should 
satisfy the first requirement for protection as intimate associations. 
On the other hand, social groups, such as the clubs at issue in 
Louisiana Debating or the hypothetical club considered in Part II.B, 
whose purposes are simply to provide a congenial atmosphere for 
their members, are less likely to cultivate and transmit shared ideals 
and beliefs. 
Notably, this first branch of a functional analysis demonstrates 
the potential for a group to be both an intimate and an expressive 
 
 164. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he values 
the Boy Scouts seeks to instill” are grounded in the “Scout Oath and Law.”). 
 165. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
618–19). 
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association. In considering the nature of a group’s expression to its 
members, functional analysis rejects the obsession with secrecy and 
privacy that has contributed to a strict prohibition on communications 
between intimate associations and the outside world under factor-
based analysis. In contrast to the court’s reasoning in Louisiana 
Debating, which considered the fact that the clubs did not even 
publicly disclose their locations as a factor weighing in the clubs’ 
favor,166 functional analysis respects the Roberts Court’s statement 
that “[t]he intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association may, of course, coincide.”167 If intimate and 
expressive association can coincide in a single group, a group’s 
expressive activity should not disqualify it from intimate status. In 
particular, the fact that a group advertises its recruitment efforts or 
participates in philanthropic activities should be considered only if 
those actions prevent the group from serving the functions that are 
characteristic of intimate associations. 
In considering the second requirement—that the group facilitate 
the creation of close bonds among its members—all of the traditional 
Roberts factors may become relevant, though not for their own sake. 
Although members of a relatively small group might be generally 
more likely to form close bonds, functional analysis gives courts 
discretion to consider groups on a case-by-case basis. A group whose 
members live together or meet frequently, for example, might be able 
to facilitate close bonds among a larger number of members than a 
group that meets less frequently. Careful selection of members based 
on compatibility and exclusion of nonmembers would also tend to 
weigh in favor of a group seeking protection because these 
characteristics are likely to improve members’ abilities to form close 
relationships. 
Considering the factors within the framework of functional 
analysis allows courts to review the relevance of any given 
characteristic in each case. Thus, commonly considered factors such 
as high turnover rates or national affiliation may not be conclusive or 
even helpful in many cases. For instance, although the high turnover 
rates and potentially large size of a public-minded group that meets 
infrequently, such as the Rotary Club, might serve as evidence that its 
members do not form close bonds, it is easy to imagine a situation in 
 
 166. La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1496 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 167. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. 
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which even relatively high annual turnover rates would not prevent 
close relationships from forming. For example, in the case of a group 
whose members participate in frequent meetings and group activities, 
the potential for the formation of significant and emotionally 
enriching relationships among members may be only marginally 
affected by the fact that a quarter of its members will graduate or 
leave the group each year. 
After a court has concluded that a group facilitates the creation 
of close bonds between its members, it must then determine whether 
the group serves that function in a way that is sufficiently similar to 
the role performed by a family relationship. Although the Court has 
never specified specify the level of similarity required, the strength of 
the bonds must situate the group close to family relationships on the 
spectrum between the most intimate and the most attenuated of 
personal attachments. In contrast to the measures of seclusion and 
isolation that have dominated factor-based analysis,168 the evaluation 
proposed by functional analysis of the strength of the bonds formed 
among group members is more consistent with the recognition of the 
family as the quintessential intimate association. After all, although 
families often interact with nonmembers and participate in activities 
outside of the household, they are largely defined by the strength of 
their relationships. 
In Roberts, the Supreme Court provided some guidance for 
comparing the strength of the bonds between members of a social 
group and those of a family, explaining that “[f]amily relationships, by 
their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a 
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also 
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”169 The bonds among 
members of truly intimate associations are therefore unique because 
individuals can only form a small number of these kinds of 
relationships over a lifetime. Other factors that might be relevant 
 
 168. See, e.g., Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 
136, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The associational interests of the Fraternity differ from the interests 
asserted by the social groups that were plaintiffs in [Louisiana Debating], on which the district 
court relied. In that case, . . . . [e]ach club had its own unmarked, private facility, which non-
members were strictly prohibited from using.”); La. Debating, 42 F.3d at 1496 (“Each club has 
only one facility, which is maintained for the exclusive use of its members and guests. No signs 
outside the Clubs’ buildings identify the locations to the public. Nonmembers are strictly 
prohibited from using the facilities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 169. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20. 
ROLING IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2011  6:44:29 AM 
2012] FUNCTIONAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION 937 
include the duration of the relationships and the extent to which 
members participate in each other’s personal lives outside of official 
group events. 
Based on these considerations, certain nonfamily social groups, 
such as fraternities and sororities, should qualify for constitutional 
protection. In many cases the bonds formed within these groups 
survive well beyond the period of active membership in the 
organization. Additionally, fraternity and sorority members often 
share in the distinctly personal aspects of fellow members’ lives, 
including not only major life events such as weddings and funerals but 
also day-to-day activities that are not planned by or related to the 
group. This potential for intimacy can be easily contrasted with the 
hypothetical social club considered in Part II.B, whose members 
shared only casual connections as a result of their concurrent use of 
the group’s facilities. 
Functional intimate association analysis, then, rejects the 
reflexive resort to the Roberts factors that has given rise to the 
traditional factor-based analysis. Instead of giving conclusive weight 
to four characteristics that serve as imprecise proxies for a group’s 
ability to provide the benefits associated with intimate associations, 
functional analysis requires courts to consider explicitly a group’s role 
in the life of its members and in the community—an analysis that may 
take into account the Roberts factors and any other characteristics 
that bear on the group’s ability to serve these two core functions. 
C. Objections to Functional Intimate Association Analysis 
Notwithstanding the greater reliability and accuracy provided by 
functional analysis, this proposal is likely to provoke criticism on the 
ground that it too greatly increases judicial discretion, too broadly 
extends constitutional protection, or represents too large a departure 
from Supreme Court precedent. As this Section illustrates, however, 
none of these objections is justified, and none should prevent courts 
from implementing functional analysis. 
First, critics might argue that because a group’s functions are 
potentially more difficult to measure than the group’s physical 
characteristics, a court would have too much flexibility in determining 
both whether a group serves the functions that are characteristic of 
intimate associations and whether, in serving those functions, the 
group is sufficiently like a family relationship. Although unrestrained 
judicial discretion has long been a concern for courts applying 
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substantive due process to protect fundamental rights,170 America’s 
judicial system relies on the ability of judges to make reasoned 
judgments reflecting a balance between competing societal values.171 
Additionally, as Chi Iota Colony demonstrates, even seemingly 
objective factors such as size are often subject to surprising 
interpretations that reflect a court’s perception of the group’s 
intimacy.172 
In fact, functional analysis would actually improve upon factor-
based analysis by increasing judicial accountability. Although courts 
would still have considerable flexibility to determine which groups 
are intimate, the basis for those decisions under functional analysis 
would need to be made more explicit. For example, when faced with a 
claim for protection by a nonintimate group, a court applying factor-
based analysis might simply point out the group’s large desired size 
and high turnover rates.173 Applying functional analysis, however, a 
court would have to use those and any other relevant factors to 
support its explicit conclusion that the group had failed to fulfill a 
characteristic function of intimate associations. Additionally, the 
group might be able to respond by making changes that would allow 
it to serve the required functions rather than attempting merely to 
manipulate its constitutional status by altering its physical 
characteristics. 
A second potential objection is that the adoption of functional 
analysis would provide constitutional protection to a greater number 
of discriminatory groups, subverting the state interest in equality. 
Although functional analysis may limit the state’s power to prevent 
private groups from discriminating, both individual liberty and 
equality are valued in the American constitutional scheme.174 By 
 
 170. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the 
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because 
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“The 
inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court 
in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always 
have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple 
rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree; 
yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our office.”). 
 172. See supra Part II.A. 
 173. See supra Part III.B. 
 174. Cf. John D. Inazu, Op-Ed., Siding with Sameness, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 
1, 2010, at 9A (“The court should have decided [Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 
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allowing courts to ignore the benefits that underlie recognition of the 
right of intimate association, factor-based analysis has weakened the 
protections for individual liberty. As a result, functional analysis is 
necessary because it ensures that courts will clearly identify the 
benefits provided by intimate association before engaging in the 
difficult balancing of liberty and equality. 
Finally, critics might question whether lower courts would have 
the authority to implement functional analysis before the question 
had reached the Supreme Court and whether approval of functional 
analysis would violate stare decisis. These concerns, however, are 
misplaced. First, the analysis proposed by this Note is not only 
consistent with but is also derived from the Supreme Court’s holdings 
in Roberts and Duarte, and its implementation would not require 
either of those decisions to be overruled. Functional analysis is 
intended only to improve the courts’ ability to protect the 
associational rights identified by the Supreme Court. Thus, lower 
courts should not be precluded from strengthening their reasoning by 
clearly explaining how the factors that they consider are related to the 
underlying values of intimate association. Second, to the extent that 
the implementation of functional analysis by the Supreme Court 
would require it to overrule factor-based decisions by lower courts, 
the Court would merely be clarifying the boundaries of the right of 
intimate association and adjusting the method of analysis rather than 
altering the right itself. Thus, neither lower federal courts nor the 
Supreme Court should be concerned about structural or prudential 
barriers to applying functional analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
More than twenty years before the right of intimate association 
was recognized in Roberts, Justice Harlan warned against a formulaic 
approach to due process, saying, “Due process has not been reduced 
to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any 
code. The best that can be said is that . . . it has represented the 
balance which our Nation . . . has struck between that liberty and the 
demands of organized society.”175 Respecting this admonition, courts 
have ordinarily rejected the allure of simple rules and have 
 
2971 (2010)] by choosing between two constitutional visions: a radical sameness that destroys 
dissenting traditions (religious, sexual or otherwise), or the destabilizing difference of a 
meaningful pluralism.”). 
 175. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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acknowledged their duty to protect fundamental rights through the 
exercise of reasoned judgment. In the context of the right of intimate 
association, however, a group’s level of constitutional protection 
often depends entirely on a court’s analysis of a handful of the 
group’s objective characteristics divorced from the values that 
originally led to the recognition of the right itself. This line of factor-
based decisions, which mistakenly treat the factors as the sole 
rationale for constitutional protection, obscures the true benefits of 
intimate associations both to group members and to the nation as a 
whole. In doing so, these decisions undermine the ability of the right 
of intimate association to protect individual liberties by providing a 
balance against other state interests. 
To save the right of intimate association, courts should abandon 
their sole reliance on the Roberts factors and adopt a functional 
analysis that clearly identifies the right’s underlying values and 
ensures that groups reflecting those considerations are consistently 
protected. By requiring courts to consider whether a group serves the 
functions that are characteristic of intimate associations—cultivating 
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs and facilitating the creation 
of close bonds between members—functional analysis provides a 
framework for considering all of the factors that may be relevant to 
the court’s determination. Functional analysis, then, restores 
reasoned judgment to a court’s consideration of intimate association 
claims by nonfamily groups and eliminates the formulaic approach 
that has threatened to undermine the court’s role as a protector of 
individual liberty. 
